Timothy Evans appeared for the Defendant. In common with many 1975 Inheritance Act cases, the claim included a claim to a beneficial interest in the estate – in this case, the two real estate assets in the estate (two flats in east London). That part of the claim failed on the facts. Unusually, the claim was defeated on no less than four separate grounds.

The Claimant, Tibor Matyas, is a Hungarian national who claimed that he had been in a romantic and a business relationship with Chris Liu, a Chinese national, for the continuous period of some 14 years ending on 10 April 2017, when Chris Liu died of cancer aged 47. It was not disputed that Mr Matyas and Mr Liu had been in a romantic and a business relationship throughout that period.

Mr Matyas also claimed that he and Chris Liu had been living together throughout that time in the same household and as though they were married or in a civil partnership. That was the basis of his 1975 Act claim.

Mr Liu left a will, which gave the whole of his business estate (which had no value) to Mr Matyas; he gave to Mr Matyas a 25% interest in one of the flats, and gave the whole of the rest of his estate to his parents and his brother, each of whom were Chinese nationals resident in China.

Mr Matyas claimed that the effect of the will was such that, having regard to the nature and length of the relationship between him and Mr Liu, reasonable financial provision had not in all the circumstances been made for him out of Mr Liu’s estate.

Although Mr Liu had died in April 2017, no grant of representation to his estate was taken out until 26 March 2024. Much of that period had been taken up in litigation between Mr Matyas and the family in China about who should take a grant. The grant was eventually ordered by the court to be made to Peter Daniel, a partner in Collyer Bristow, as the court-appointed administrator.

Section 4 of the 1975 Act requires an application under that Act to be issued within 6 months after the relevant grant of representation is first taken out, unless the court permits a later application.

Mr Matyas first issued his claim under the 1975 Act on 26 September 2024, i.e. on the very last day of the section 4 time limit. However, he made the deliberate decision not to join Mr Daniel as a defendant, but to join only the Chinese family.

Mr Matyas failed, however, to serve his claim on the Chinese family, and his claim form expired on 26 March 2025.

He therefore issued a new claim form, on 16 April 2025, this time joining (and serving) Mr Daniel as a defendant. He necessarily applied, in addition to an order under section 2 of the 1975 Act for reasonable financial provision to be for him out of Mr Liu’s estate, for permission to bring the claim late.

The claim came before Upper Tribunal Judge Andrew Scott sitting as a deputy High Court Judge.

The judge dismissed the 1975 Act claim on the following grounds:

• Although Mr Liu had clearly been resident in England since 2002, and although the grant of representation to his estate recited that he had died domiciled in England and Wales, it was undisputed that he had been born in China of Chinese national parents. On the face of it, therefore, his domicile of origin was China. There was no convincing evidence that Mr Liu had abandoned his domicile of origin in favour of England and Wales, and the judge concluded that at his death Mr Liu was not domiciled in England and Wales. Section 1 of the 1975 Act makes it clear that a claim under the Act cannot proceed unless the deceased died domiciled in England and Wales. The 1975 Act claim must therefore fail on that ground alone.
• Mr Matyas’ claim depended on the assertion that he and Mr Liu had, throughout the period of 2 years ending with Mr Liu’s death, lived together in the same household and as though they were married or in a civil partnership. The judgment contains a detailed analysis of the criteria for satisfying the ‘same household’ and ‘living as though married’ elements of the test, and a detailed application of the available evidence to those criteria. Both elements needed to be proved by evidence, including evidence that Mr Matyas and Mr Liu had presented themselves to the outside world as a couple in a committed relationship akin to that of marriage or a civil partnership.
• Reasonable financial provision: The judge found that reasonable financial provision for Mr Matyas’ maintenance had been made for Mr Matyas on Mr Liu’s death. The facts that Mr Matyas had, by the date of the trial, dissipated most of that provision, and that his financial situation was now perilous, did not affect that conclusion.
• Section 4 time-limit: Having issued his first Claim Form for relief under the 1975 Act within the 6-month limit under section 4 of the 1975 Act, Mr Matyas then required permission to serve the Chinese family (who were the only defendants to the Claim Form) out of the jurisdiction. But he never applied for permission, simply sending the court documents to the Chinese family by email. That Claim Form having expired, Mr Matyas then issued his second Claim Form, this time joining Mr Daniel as the defendant, but the issue of the second Claim Form was some 6 ½ months after the expiry of the section 4 time-limit. It was also some 8 years after Mr Liu’s death. The judge refused Mr Matyas’ application to make his 1975 Act claim late. His principal reason was his attribution of most of the delay since Mr Liu’s death and before the expiry of the section 4 time-limit to Mr Matyas’ deliberate and sustained efforts to delay the administration of Mr Liu’s estate.

Timothy Evans was instructed by Collyer Bristow. 

Read the judgment in full: Matyas v Daniel [2026] EWHC 1386 (Ch)