A landmark judgment has been handed down in two significant rights of light claims, in which Tim Calland and Timothy Foot acted for the successful Claimants.

In Cooper v Ludgate House Limited and Powell v Ludgate House Limited [2025] EWHC 1724 (Ch), Mr Justice Fancourt found that the Defendant had caused a nuisance by its interference with the Claimants’ rights of light, and made awards of negotiating damages of £500,000 and £350,000 (in lieu of an injunction). These are believed to be the highest negotiating damages ever awarded in a rights of light case.

In the course of his judgment, Mr Justice Fancourt addressed a number of important issues for property practitioners, especially in a rights of light context.

Background

The Claimants own flats in Bankside Lofts, a late-1990s development between the southern end of Blackfriars Bridge and the Tate Modern gallery.

The Defendant (and related companies) own a development site called Bankside Yards, to the west of Bankside Lofts, on which a number of high-rise buildings are being or will be constructed.

The first building to be built in the Bankside Yards development was an office block (called “Arbor”). Construction of Arbor began in October 2019.

When it is fully constructed, the Bankside Yards development will significantly interfere with the light of neighbouring property owners. In late 2019, the Defendant wrote to owners of neighbouring properties (including in Bankside Lofts) to make offers of compensation for the injury to their light.

Some of the neighbouring property-owners (including the Claimants) did not accept these offers, and in 2022 the developers asked Southwark Borough Council to put in place protection of the site under section 203 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016, which provides that: “A person may carry out building or maintenance work to which this subsection applies even if it involves […] interfering with a relevant right or interest […]”.

Southwark Borough Council put in place that protection. Importantly, however, the section 203 protection did not extend to Arbor, because construction on that part of the site was already substantially complete.

The Claimants therefore brought claims for an injunction requiring the demolition of Arbor, or alternatively damages.

Issues addressed by the judgment

The nature of a right of light

The unusual circumstances of this case meant that the Court had to address fundamental questions about the nature of a right of light.

Mr Justice Fancourt re-examined the leading case of Colls v Home and Colonial Stores [1904] AC 179, in which the House of Lords held that the owner of a right of light does not necessarily have a right to all the light passing over a servient tenement. He only has the right to sufficient light for the ordinary uses of mankind, including light derived from other sources.

As to which sources of other light should be counted, Lord Lindley had held in Colls that “light to which a right has not been acquired by grant or prescription, and of which the plaintiff may be deprived at any time, ought not to be taken into account”.

The parties differed as to the interpretation of this rule.

The Defendant argued that the Claimants’ rights of light over the rest of Bankside Yards should be taken into account, even though in practice much of that light was going to be blocked. It said that the Claimants had not lost their rights to that light, and interference with it was compensated by section 204.

Having reviewed the other relevant authorities, Mr Justice Fancourt rejected that argument and concluded that “the true reason…why light has been left out of account is that the claimant cannot protect it, not simply that the claimant has no right to it” (at [89]).

He therefore held that because the Claimants could not in practice defend the light over the rest of Bankside Yards, it should not be taken into account.

The methodology for measuring interference with a right of light

The Judge was also asked by the Defendant to find that there was no interference with the Claimants’ light, on the basis of a series of computer-modelled calculations: vertical sky component, no-sky line, annual probable sunlight hours, median daylight factor (MDF), and median daylight illuminance (MDI).

The Defendant said that the traditional method for assessing interference with light in a room, devised by Percy Waldram in the 1920s, was outdated and should be replaced.

Mr Justice Fancourt refused to depart from the Waldram method, at least in this case. He accepted (at [240]) that the newer methods, particularly MDF and MDI, might have some use in a “marginal” or unusual case, and that “further research” may in due course reveal difficulties with the application of the Waldram method, but “Waldram remains used and broadly respected by the whole light surveying industry. It has stood the test of time and has the confidence of the industry. It is not really plausible to suggest that the calibration is hopelessly awry in all cases.”

Moreover, he went on to say (at [242]):

“If reliance on the Radiance methods ultimately comes down to a subjective and impressionistic assessment of false colour graphical representations of results, rather than the results themselves (as was the case here), then I question the value of that. It amounts to replacing an established, universally applied, agreed standard with the subjective opinion of an expert light surveyor – which was the opposite of what Percy Waldram attempted to do over 100 years ago.”

The court’s discretion whether to order an injunction

While the Claimants were not successful in persuading the Court to grant them an injunction for the demolition of Arbor, the judgment is notable for its extensive exposition of the applicable legal principles (following Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13) in a rights of light context.

The Judge’s reasoning is summarised at [308]. He took into account a wide range of factors, including the public interest, harm to third parties, and the possibility that an injunction would be futile (because the developer could rebuild Arbor after demolition, but with the protection of section 203).

However, the Judge accepted that the Claimants were deserving of substantive relief. He rejected the Defendant’s allegations that the Claimants were only seeking to protect their views of the Thames or to obtain financial benefit by claiming an injunction. Moreover, he indicated that, had damages in lieu not been available, there would have been a “strong argument” in favour of injunctive relief (at [323]).

Negotiating damages

The judgment provides clarifications in two important respects in relation to damages in lieu of an injunction. In the alternative to their claim for an injunction, the Claimants sought “negotiating damages” – that is, what the parties would have agreed as a release fee for the Claimants' rights in a hypothetical negotiation immediately prior to the construction of Arbor.

First, the Judge rejected the Defendant’s argument that negotiating damages were not available for the loss of the right to enforce a right of light (or an easement more generally). This is of considerable significance following the Supreme Court’s decision in Morris-Garner v One Step (Support) Ltd [2018] UKSC 20, which the Judge accepted “creates a new principled basis for determining whether negotiating damages are available” (at [319]).

Second, the Judge addressed the method of assessment of negotiating damages in a rights of light context. He surveyed the range of possible methods and accepted that, while the Claimants should not be supposed to have been able to hold the Defendant to “ransom”, the factors in the negotiation included the additional development value that the Defendant would gain by acquiring the Claimants’ rights.

He held that the Defendant would have agreed to pay the Claimants (and neighbouring owners with rights of light) a total of 10-15% of the increase in development value (which he valued at between £3m and £4.5m). This figure had then to be apportioned between those with rights of light, and was further adjusted to reflect other factors, including the value of the Claimants’ flats.

The judge concluded that Mr Cooper should receive negotiating damages of £350,000 and Mr and Mrs Powell £500,000. The award to the Powells is understood to be the highest ever award in a rights of light case.

The full judgment can be viewed here: Cooper v Ludgate House Limited and Powell v Ludgate House Limited